In the geopolitical conflict over the South China Sea (SCS), fishers are at the center of Chinese and Vietnamese cartographic imaginations that define the sea as either "Chinese" or "Vietnamese" and hence tied to the disputed territories of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. While their historical presence and customary fishing rights in the SCS have been much publicized in the context of this territorial dispute, the long-standing Cham seafaring trade networks and legacy are ignored by both countries. The ethnic and national categories of Cham, Việt, and Han intersect with occupational categories such as those of fisher, trader, shipbuilder, sailor, and pirate, which in the past represented shifting, relational, and situational activities by the same people. The contemporary use of such professional and national labels produces particular political effects by projecting recent closures and enclosures onto the past, in spite of the common historical, cultural, and ethnic flows that always existed in the SCS. Rather than aiming to legitimize or delegitimize Vietnam's or China's territorial claims to the SCS, this article argues that seafaring narratives should be liberated from abstract, anachronistic discourses of sovereignty, territoriality, and territorial anxieties that separate the interconnected histories of the Cham, Vietnamese, and Chinese.
Introduction
By taking its jurisdictional claims to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal in 2013, the Philippines challenged China's demand that it not internationalize the issue of the South China Sea (SCS). On June 12, 2016, the definitive ruling issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague made global headlines. The court not only refuted China's "nine-dash" claim 1 on the basis of historic rights, but it also stated that "although Chinese navigators and fishermen, as well as those of other states, had historically Roszko 20 Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 21 (December 2016) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-21) made use of the islands in the South China Sea, there was no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or their resources."
2 Opening a new legal chapter in the SCS disputes, the PCA decision was pathbreaking. It showed that none of the major claimants-China, Vietnam, or the Philippines-could claim 12 nautical miles of territorial sea or 200 nautical miles of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the SCS due to historic fishing rights or land reclamation. The court's ruling not only offered insight into how historic fishing rights are used by states to enforce closures and enclosures at sea, but also goes to the heart of the cartographic imagination of China and of one of its most vocal opponents-Vietnam-as both states claim virtually all of the sea features in the Paracels and Spratlys.
In both China and Vietnam, the SCS disputes evoke strong nationalist feelings along with a desire to include far-distant waters and largely submerged reefs and shoals within a bounded national space. Chinese and Vietnamese historians, archaeologists, journalists, and citizens in their home countries and abroad have called for consolidated efforts to clarify facts, standardize understanding, and provide scientific and historical evidence of China's and Vietnam's "motherland" and of their "indisputable sovereignty" over the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos. In their claims to state sovereignty and treatment of the sea as land, China and Vietnam employ a rich arsenal of political strategies that help their citizens to imagine and identify with those remote reefs and rocks as part of their national territories (Roszko 2015) . The "desire for mappability and the fear of unmappability (cartographic anxiety)" (Painter 2008, 349) animate man-made features, construction of artificial islands on the reefs, resettlement of fishers in disputed territories, state subsidies paid to fishers for their fishing operations in the Paracels and Spratlys, the establishment of the new Chinese administrative city of Sansha on the Paracels, and the practice of sending Vietnamese Buddhist monks to the Spratlys. 4 Some of these strategies have been considered in terms of boundary delimitation, political development, and economic or military security (Bonnet 2012; Chemillier-Gendreau 2000; Tønnesson 2006; Hill, Owen, and Roberts 1991) . However, seafaring narratives and fisheries as an object of analysis are rarely considered, despite being increasingly used for mapmaking and maritime territorialization (Roszko 2015) .
In this article, I shift the gaze from the geopolitical conflict between China and Vietnam to fishing communities and long-term connections, flows, and networks in the SCS. Historically, ideological and cultural flows of knowledge, beliefs, expertise, technology, and goods-whether carried out by traders and seafarers on merchant ships or fishing junks-crossed vast ocean spaces and political boundaries, making the seas "unifying fields around which societies interacted" (Reid 1999, 39) . For people living along the coast, the SCS always provided livelihoods from fishing, trade, and more: over centuries, different fishing communities, city ports, and urban markets formed multiple networks that linked up geographically distant coastal and maritime areas, straddling and transgressing borders without regard to the expansion of nation-states (Tagliacozzo 2009, 103) .
With the early twentieth century's concept of homogeneous bounded space replacing imperial understandings of unbounded space and territory (Callahan 2009, 141, 146) , fishers have been inscribed into a cartographic order of the present-day nation-state (Winichakul 1994; Hill 1991) . The legal regime of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) represents the largest enclosure in history, nationalizing vast expanses of ocean space and resources, and extending states' national sovereignty beyond the limits of terrestrial jurisdiction. Yet, in the context of the highly fluid material nature of the sea-whether in terms of migratory fish species or sea features that cannot sustain human life-sovereignty at sea remains an unsettled and extractive practice that states construct not in isolation but in relation to one another. The unboundedness of the sea and of seaborne networks and flows generates territorial anxiety predicated on a historically recent understanding of territoriality as a constituent of state-spatial thinking represented and produced through cartographic technologies (Elden 2009 (Elden , 2013 Painter 2008) . Consequently, the spatial and temporal connectedness existing at sea must be tamed and turned into the productive tool of a grid map representing contemporary closures and enclosure. The assertion of bounded, defined space takes effect in public discourses: the SCS has come to be seen as exclusively "Chinese" or "Vietnamese" waters where fishers and their customary practices are placed at the center of China's and Vietnam's cartographic imaginations and territorial claims.
In those rapidly changing and fluid zones, the territorial conflict over the two archipelagos put fishers in the vanguard of national sovereignty in the SCS, or "East Sea" (V.
Biển Đông), and linked them to the goals of "economic growth, regime and national security" (Wirth 2016, 79; Roszko 2015) . In addition, territorial claims encourage Vietnamese and Chinese fishers to redefine their mental maps and historical narratives of fishing territories in line with cartographic discourses projected by their respective states-a process often overlooked by international relations analyses of the SCS (see Buszynski and Roberts 2015) . Unpacking fishers' narratives of historical connections with the disputed areas of the Paracels and Spratlys requires a deeper understanding of how ethnic classifications came to signify national ones, and how they are used together with occupational categories to draw maritime boundaries between Vietnam and China. My primary aim here is not merely to reiterate the well-worn argument that fishing and trade networks existed long before nation-states, but rather to show how the old circulations in maritime zones have been appropriated and transformed by state and non-state actors to serve contemporary geopolitical claims. To fully recognize these circulations and the territorial anxieties they produce, one needs to pay attention to both contemporary projections about fishers by their states and "long-term patterns of mobility developed from a historical ecology, driven… by coastal societies" (Wheeler 2015, 34) . Thus, I seek a broader perspective on the contemporary projection about fishers into the past, which overlays and conflates national and professional categories to serve the current narratives of the imagined sovereign territories of China and Vietnam.
Zooming in on coastal society and its mobility, I follow the trend among historians of underlining complex interrelationships and connections with regions themselves (Braudel 1995; Chaudhuri 1985; Hamashita 2008) . While stressing maritime connections, networks, and transnational flows over vast oceans is not new, the political frame, administrative boundaries, and national histories still form the privileged units of historical analysis. In their seminal volume Asia Inside Out: Connected Places, anthropologist Helen Siu and historians Eric Tagliacozzo and Peter Perdue plead for attention to "the political ambiguities of these commercialized regions and the fluid cultural and political identities of those engaged with these places" (2015, 7).
Maintaining the momentum of this plea (see Amrith 2013; Sheriff and Ho 2014; Hall 2011; Ho 2006; Li 1998; Tagliacozzo and Chang 2011; Tagliacozzo, Siu, and Perdue 2015; Tran and Reid 2006) , I argue that narratives of fisheries in the SCS need to be liberated from abstract and anachronistic discourses of sovereignty, territoriality, and territorial anxieties that impose artificial boundaries in the form of monolithic ethnic categories and draw lines between littoral communities of Vietnam and China, despite their interconnected regional and occupational histories. Only then can we see the emerging "non-national actors, networks and movements" (Tran and Reid 2006, 4; see also Duara 1995; Krishna 1994; Sutherland 2014) This article is divided into three parts. The first section explores present-day seafaring narratives of Vietnam and China and current ways of imagining the SCS. The second section links this discussion to Cham seafaring narratives. The final section traces how the ethnic and national categories of Cham, Việt, and Han intersect and overlay professional categoriesincluding that of fisherman, trader, ship builder, sailor, and pirate-to produce an exclusive category of "Vietnamese" or "Chinese" fishers operating in the past. Interrogating these blurred categories, I conclude that such labels are used to produce particular political effects, in the form of recent enclosures of the SCS. operations. In China, fishing activities are projected as an element of economic growth, "opening" (C. kaifa), "protecting" (baohu), and "developing the ocean economy" (fazhan haiyang jingji); in Vietnam, fisheries become a patriotic symbol of defending "territorial sovereignty" (V. bảo vệ chủ quyền lãnh thổ) over the Paracels and Spratlys. 6 Tanmen fishermen are the best-known maritime militia. They have been directly involved in major conflicts in the SCS (Zhang 2016) and are considered by the Chinese government to continue the "ancient tradition of cultivating the sea." Less well known is the Cham community in Sanya and its historic connections with the SCS. While the seafaring legacy of Lý Sơn and Tanmen have gained much publicity in recent years, the Cham historical presence at sea is disregarded by both Vietnam and China-a point to which I will return later.
Having the rare opportunity to spend time on both the Vietnamese and Chinese sides of the maritime border, I started my ethnographic immersion by looking more closely at how Both groups, however, conveyed deep territorial anxiety over "the space of [national] desire" (Krishna 1994, 510) that is now the SCS. In China, the central and local state provides subsidies to Tanmen fishers, whose maritime operations stretch China's borders across the Paracels and Spratlys; in Vietnam, Vietnamese citizens, rather than the government, donate money to encourage fishers to cling to the sea and their fishing grounds to defend national sovereignty (V. bám ngư trường để bảo vệ chủ quyền tổ quốc) (Roszko 2016, 369) . The economic incentives extended to Chinese fishers and the narratives about Vietnamese fishers allegedly victimized by Chinese vessels produce not only asymmetric relations between the two countries and fishing groups, but also different anxieties that are manifested, calmed, and translated into desires and hopes (Broers and Toal 2013; Krishna 1994; Painter 2008) . As a result, these anxieties function like a mirror, distorting old fishing arrangements by making them mutually exclusive to fit a narrow image of national territorial claims.
Navigating the South China Sea
Recently, China has been replacing traditional wooden fishing vessels with steel-hulled trawlers equipped with high-tech navigational and communication systems. These boats are believed to extend the imagined national geo-body-composed of both territory and nation (Winichakul 1994 navigational knowledge passed from father to son, sometimes in the form of a "logbook." In those family logbooks men recorded time, distance, currents, tides, the position of stars, passing birds, and many other details observed during their sea voyages. In traditional navigation, geng was an important term used to measure distance by many Hainanese sailors. One geng is equivalent to 60 Chinese miles (li), but one full day from morning to midnight would be equal to approximately 10 geng. As Tanmen fishers explained, they used the "geng method" together with a few lighted incense sticks to calculate the time and direction of their passage on the sea.
Since sailing to the Paracels required their boats to move on a zigzag course to avoid hidden rocks, the sailors followed the information in their logbooks and their own experience to calculate how many incense sticks had to be burned before each turn. Today, these logbooks, known in China as Geng lu bu (Manual of sea routes), are used by the Chinese government as evidence of a long-standing Chinese presence in the disputed archipelagos and "ironclad proof of China's sovereignty over the South China Sea," even though the traditional navigational knowledge was not unique to Tanmen fishers.
8 Lý Sơn sailors also kept records of their voyages to the Paracels and Spratlys and measured distance with incense sticks, as did Tanmen and many fishers in the region, before nautical charts came into widespread use.
Most of the time, however, fishers tried to convince me that Chinese or Vietnamese, depending on which group they came from, were the "only group" to have, since "time One Tanmen resident was equally ungenerous in his opinion:
If Vietnamese people go to the Paracels (C. Xisha) or the Spratlys (C. Nansha), they learned [how to do so] from Tanmen people. In the past they did not have any boats; they had just bamboo basket-boats (C. luo kuan; V. ghe bầu). trawler operated between the disputed archipelagos for more than two months at a stretch. She told me that she often saw Vietnamese fishing boats anchored in the vicinity of the Paracels, their crews busily collecting sea cucumbers. She said, "They are fishers like we are, and they need to earn their living too, so we do not disturb each other." Her statement made more sense to me when I learned that the sea cucumbers collected by the Vietnamese often end up in Tanmen's traditional marine pharmaceuticals. The sea not only divides but, more importantly, connects the Tanmen and Lý Sơn fisheries through the collection of and trade in many marine products used for tourist souvenirs, jewelry and decoration, and traditional medicine. Unseen by customs, endangered species are directly transferred from Vietnamese to Chinese fishing vessels at sea or transported by Sino-Vietnamese traders to Guangxi or Guangdong Province. The collection and trade in these goods might take place on a relatively small scale, but they nevertheless link the Chinese and Vietnamese economies, as the economic value of "rare" and "exotic" marine products increases along with demand in a situation of ecological deterioration. These ethnographic examples reveal different patterns of Vietnamese-Chinese interaction and people's "micro-strategies" (Chan 2013, 123) for navigating the sea border. Political scientist Hongzhou Zhang (2016, 69) national time and space, "Vietnamese identity" is projected far into the past and onto people who were not part of the contemporary nation-state.
In early Southeast Asia, the Cham were known not only as skillful seafarers and successful merchants but also as "pirates" (Hall 2011 ), due to their naval raids on coastal areas.
Between the seventh and fifteenth centuries they established their rule over coastal plains and mountain zones in what is now south-central Vietnam. The Cham never formed a unified kingdom, and their naval attacks on the coast drew on ethnically diverse maritime people (Hall 2011, 80) . In the fifteenth century, Champa was invaded by Đại Việt-the name of the Việt polity at the time-which gradually took control of the entire Cham territory; only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were the Nguyễn lords able to establish their power in the River Delta, and to adopt local elements like Cham deities or spirit cults, which were free from Confucian restrictions (Li 1998, 101-116) . Vietnamese migrants colonizing the old Cham territory worshiped tutelary spirits that they had never worshiped in their places of origin. The new experience of the sea, the encounter with the unfamiliar Cham civilization, and interethnic marriages produced quite different patterns from those of northern Vietnam (Li 1998) . One thousand years ago, consumed by flames of fire and covered with clouds of smoke, the Việt (Yuenan) territory was plunged into the chaos of war. The cities were swept by death, political affairs were paralyzed, and [Cham] lives hardened as their property was taken away. When in those oppressive years their faith started to fade they left [Vietnam] without hope of returning. Women, old men, and children took a long and difficult path,… driven aimlessly by the sea into the far corners of the earth….
Those wandering Muslims arrived in a mysterious, depopulated, and backward place where the environment was harsh…. They arrived at the Asian coastline that had a huge bay on the west side of Plum Mountains (Sanya). Exploring the sea and its paths and depth many times they finally settled down, built up their fortune, established business and maintained their livelihoods….
Taking roots in this deserted and wild territory, Huizu [Chinese Muslims] were born from the wind and rain and from the sweat as they worked at sea.… Generation after generation, dynasty after dynasty, they sacrificed themselves and endured heavy and difficult social transformations. They are the family that was broken up and its members dispersed. Put to the severe test, after all that, they did not surround and assimilate or allow themselves to be fear-stricken, because their [Muslim] identity is in their blood and sustains their fight to improve their lives.
According to linguists Graham Thurgood, Ela Thurgood, and Li Fengxiang (2006, 20) (Thurgood, Thurgood, and Li 2006, 24) . The Cham elder confirmed that, indeed, trade and fishing were important activities for centuries, but he also explained that this changed after the Japanese invasion of Hainan (1939 Hainan ( -1945 , when Cham homes, mosques, fishing equipment, and boats were destroyed, putting considerable strain on their livelihoods. During the land reform of 1950 to 1953, the local authorities distributed land among Cham, organized them into production units, and trained them to farm, while limiting their fishing-based economy to shallow sea areas. He also mentioned that, a few years later, the land that had been given to them was taken away again. Today, the Cham people in Sanya engage in a wide array of business activities, rather than farming. Some men work as rickshaw drivers, and many families own small restaurants, food stalls, or shops selling daily requisites. claims of ancient differentiation from China without acknowledging the Cham maritime legacy on its own terms. In Lý Sơn, the Việt were the latest residents in the island's long history of settlement, and the Cham presence prior to their arrival in the seventeenth century still creates anxiety among Việt about their identity and rights over the land (Roszko 2016, 354) . Southeast Asia historian Anthony Reid points out that the Cham remain "an embarrassment" to Vietnamese nationalism and "a reminder that borders have not always been where they came to rest in the colonial era, and that group identities were by no means fixed or immutable" (1999, 40) . Thus, for Vietnam, more than for China, the Cham remain a source of deep territorial anxiety, which impels the state to project them as just an "ancient civilization," completely ignoring their seafaring legacy and interconnections in present-day national narratives of the SCS. While colonial maps of Cochinchina are often used by nationalists as the tool of modern and "objective" knowledge (Roszko 2015 (Roszko , 2016 Sasges 2016) , those cartographic images that refer to "Champa" sit uncomfortably in the social memory of Vietnam and its society, which expanded southward through the pacification of the Cham territory into the Khmer realm.
Việt, Cham, and Han beyond the Nation
According to local narratives, the forefathers of Tanmen identity is an invention that goes back to the nineteenth century, when the Qing empire became the present-day Chinese nation-state (Gladney 2004, 14) .
Like the Han category in China, the idea of "Vietnameseness" enjoys a powerful and hegemonic position in Vietnam. I have written elsewhere that the idea of "Vietnameseness" dismisses regional, historical, and cultural differences and sidelines places such as Lý Sơn Island that do not represent the imagined culture of northern Vietnam (Roszko 2016, 352) . Parallel to trends in scholarship on China, historians of Vietnam recently have pointed out different ways of acting Vietnamese that have existed across space and time (Taylor 1998 (Taylor , 2013 Li 1998 Li , 2006 Tran and Reid 2006) . Li contends that the Việt occupation of the land to the south in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not a replacement of Cham culture and civilization with Vietnamese, but rather a "fruitful interaction ended by creating a new way of being Vietnamese" (Li 1998, 99 professional categories-as they intermingled with the Cham and engaged in sailing, pillaging, shipbuilding, trading, and fishing-are a living example of this dynamic process.
Fishers, Seafarers, Traders, and Pirates
At present, fluidity of ethnic and professional categories is rarely considered in the national seafaring narratives of Chinese and Vietnamese fishers. The people who are today called fishers often also functioned in the past as shipbuilders, sailors, traders, and pirates: spatial and temporal categories enacted in particular situations and contexts. These professional categories were always relational and situational rather than ontological. The label "pirate" was repeatedly attached to others, even though seafaring, fishery, trade, and piracy had always represented connected sea-oriented economies that did not recognize or respect political boundaries (Murray 1987; Warren 1981; Wheeler 2015) .
In the last few years the Vietnamese party-state has become directly engaged in recovering and preserving local traditions and documents related to the Paracel (Hoàng Sa) and (Gutzlaff 1849) . Around the same time, a Scottish hydrographer, James Horsburgh, recorded that some local seafarers from Hainan were undertaking fishing voyages lasting up to two months and stretching as far as 700 or 800 miles into the SCS (1852, 346). Collecting sea cucumbers, tortoiseshells, and other marine goods, they freely navigated their hardwood vessels between numerous reefs, shoals, and sandbanks of the Paracels and Spratlys in the SCS. While these rocks and reefs were a deadly hazard for Europeans, for Cham, Việt, and Hainanese seafarers they were part of their livelihood, which was based on maritime knowledge, navigation skills, and trade. During my conversation with Tanmen fishers, many recalled stories of their forefathers' voyages to the two archipelagos. It was not rare to take a buffalo along in order to graze it on the grassier islets of the Paracels and spend more than a month there fishing for turtles and sea snails and waiting for the collected sea cucumbers to dry in the sun. The precolonial and colonial sources are repeatedly cited as proof of Vietnamese sovereignty, but when read in their entirety they demonstrate instead that for neo-Confucian Vietnam and China, sovereignty was about people, not territories (Sasges 2016; Hill 1991) . Therefore, rather than discussing whether the colonial sources confirm or deny Vietnamese or Chinese sovereignty over the disputed territories, I want to draw attention to the detail, in Gutzlaff's passage, that fishers from both Annam (present-day Central Vietnam) and Hainan were historically present in the Paracels and Spratlys. The German missionary described this as follows:
From time immemorial, junks in large number from Haenan [sic] , have annually visited all these shoals and proceeded in their excursions as far as the coast of Borneo. Though more than ten per cent. are annually wrecked, the quantity of fish taken is so great as to ensure all loss, and still leave a very good profit. The Annam government, perceiving the advantages which it might derive if a toll were raised, keeps revenue cutters and a small garrison on the spot to collect the duty on all visitors, and to ensure protection to its own fishermen. A considerable intercourse has thus gradually been established, and promises to grow in importance on account of the abundance of fish which come to these banks to spawn. Some islets bear a [sic] stunted vegetation, but fresh water is wanting; and those sailors who neglect to take with them a good supply are often put to great straits (Gutzlaff 1849, 93) .
The elderly residents of Tanmen and Lý Sơn whom I spoke with considered the two archipelagos to be their traditional fishing grounds and underlined their own cosmopolitan status as traders.
Lý Sơn people explained that their ancestors ventured into the Paracels and Spratlys before the royal court in Huế found out about their profitable salvage of the wrecked ships and, ultimately, ordered them to formalize their activities as the Paracel and Spratly flotillas. Referring to the SCS dispute, they also said that-whether or not the Vietnamese government would provide financial or military support for their fishing fleets-the islanders were determined to continue their operations in those areas, because this was how they had always earned their livelihood (Roszko 2016, 364) .
Fishing and Pillaging
Historian Robert Antony (2014) Sơn Island was also considered a dangerous and inaccessible place for ships to anchor due to the coral reef and rocks surrounding its coast (White 1824, 75) , and it was thus a perfect location for those elements labeled "pirates" by Europeans. Europeans considered Lý Sơn Island a key marker on their way to Guangdong, before they used the sea-lane through the Macclesfield Bank.
They needed to have the island on their right side; otherwise, they could run dangerously aground at the Paracels. 
Shipbuilding and Trade
Historically, Lý Sơn and Tanmen were sites of local shipbuilding, which required considerable maritime knowledge and seafaring skills. The basket boat-mocked by one of the Tanmen villagers above-was highly popular up to the nineteenth century in southern Vietnam, but its style was borrowed from the Cham (Li 1998, 112; Pham 2013) . The Cham themselves were influenced by Malays and Arabs with whom they traded in the region. The Cham boats I have seen on the Sanya shore were often described by ethnic Chinese as "primitive," because they were built from light material such as planks, bamboo, and Styrofoam. However, I would argue that they reflect long-term experience on the sea and genuine skill in blending various technologies. The bamboo planks in the Cham boats were sewn together with rope without using nails, a shipbuilding technique typical of traditional Arab dhows used in the Indian Ocean (see Sheriff 2010) .
14 Historian and maritime archeologist Charlotte Pham (2013) points out that Chinese boatbuilding was influenced by Southeast Asian ships, but technological evolutions-as the examples above show-were complex and multidimensional. This suggests that fishers in
Hainan and Vietnam were not a homogeneous group and that their language, customs, and fishing junks differed from group to group. Commenting on one of the fishing groups in southwest Hainan in 1868, Swinhoe wrote that "the fishermen were the most barbarous we have seen on this coast, many of them perfectly naked. Their boats were constructed very like the Japanese boats at Nagasaki" (1868, 13).
Regardless of exactly who those fishers were, boatbuilding was a "repository of cultural and technological exchanges but also a cradle of and source of interconnectedness" (Pham 2013, 162 Cambodia and then bought an additional quantity in Bangkok, where they would spend up to two months building junks. These junks, loaded with rice, would return to Hainan or Canton, where they would be sold for good profit together with their cargos (Gutzlaff 1834, 82-83) . Since the rice grown was insufficient to meet the needs of the Tanmen population, marine goods, livestock, raw sugar, betel nut, rattan, incense timber, and medical plants were also traded to Southeast Asian countries, including Cochin-China, Singapore, and Siam (see Michalk 1985, 121; Csete 2006, 229) , to provide income for buying rice.
As in the case of Tanmen, Lý Sơn people continued to capitalize on their seafaring capacity when the flotillas ceased their naval activities in the Paracels and Spratlys. Following the cold winter monsoon, they sailed to the south, where they traded salt and local products such as fish sauce, peanut oil, and fishing nets. Waiting for the southern summer monsoon, they would offer themselves as seasonal labor to rich French and Chinese people. The income they earned was used to purchase rice that was shipped back to Lý Sơn (Roszko 2016; see also Li 2004) . En route home, Lý Sơn sailors would take on board Cham traders of medicinal plants, which were in great demand on the island.
Reflecting on the mobility and skills of Lý Sơn or Tanmen people, we could say that the occupational roles they embraced did not rest exclusively on fishing and shipbuilding; seafaring and trade came in handy at all times. The blurred lines and fluidity between professions and ethnicity problematize conceptualizations of a monolithic Chinese or Vietnamese nation and culture (Evans 2002) . Probing into the past requires giving up "the distorting lens of the nation" (Evans 2002, 159 ) and bringing to light many pasts that were driven by both ecology and people (Taylor and Whitmore 1995) . ties and networks (Tagliacozzo 2009, 114) . In those watery realms, Việt, Cham, and Chinese histories intermingled, making ethnic and occupational labels fluid, depending on geographical and historical contexts. Today, to deal with the boundlessness of the sea, the professional label of "fisherman" is combined with the national categories of "Vietnamese" or "Chinese" to enforce present-day maritime enclosures and project them into the past despite the common historical, cultural, and ethnic flows that always existed in the SCS. Paraphrasing South Asia historian Sunil Amrith, who rightly observes that "oceanic history is itself a kind of cartography" (2013, 285), I argue that by foregrounding the SCS's fishers-linked by seafaring skills, trade, and voyages-we can see beyond the imposed cartographic order and territorial anxieties of the modern nation-state to a more inclusive world, in which Cham history does not end where Lý Sơn and Hainan histories begin. In this world, fishing-next to trade and seafaring-has no definable national borders. Programme (FP7/2007 under REA grant agreement no. PIEF-GA-2012-326795 I analyzed maritime territorialization, sovereignty, and territoriality in the context of the SCS disputes in Roszko (2015) . 5
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